Authoritarian elections in Egypt: Formal institutions and informal mechanisms of rule

In recent years, electoral processes in non-democratic settings have been analysed either within the framework of transitology or disregarded entirely by scholars of comparative politics. Analysing the Egyptian case, this article proposes a different conceptual framework. The interaction between electoral institutions and authoritarian dynamics is conceptualized in terms of the relationship between formal and informal institutions. In the Egyptian authoritarian political system, informal mechanisms of neopatrimonial rule not only take precedence over formalized rules and procedures but integrate formal electoral institutions into the authoritarian system. Drawing on empirical evidence from legislative elections under the rule of President Husni Mubarak, this article identifies three main functions for electoral processes in non-democratic settings: (1) Electoral contests serve to periodically renew channels of clientelist inclusion, drawing both voters and deputies into networks of patronage culminating at the top of the political system. (2) Formal inclusion of parts of the opposition into the electoral arena enhances the range of means available to the ruling elite in order to control these actors. (3) Pitted against each other in electoral contests, individual members of the ruling elite's lower echelons are effectively controlled and tied to the informal structures of rule. Thus, the principal traits of the Egyptian neopatrimonial regime remain unchanged, with formal electoral processes subverted by informal institutions of authoritarian rule to an extent as to fulfil distinctly authoritarian functions.