Why should we take action to move towards a greener world if doing so will cause the birth of a totally different group of future people? In this chapter we start from the metaphysical evidence that a large part of climate actions imply a change in the identity of future generations, as opposed to a counterfactual laissez faire attitude. This is a climatic fallout from the famous non-identity paradox introduced by Derek Parfit. Therefore, we ask if and how it is possible to defend a principle of transgenerational responsibility against this metaphysical complexity. We proceed by splitting the paradox into a moral argument, which is based on the person-affecting view of harm, and a metaphysical premise, which treats non-identity as a result of variations in timing and manner of a person’s conception. We begin by examining three different strategies through which to circumvent the moral argument: non-consequentialist accounts of harm, moral thresholds and an impersonal ethics. However, we argue that all three strategies either fall short of circumventing the non-identity paradox or they do so at too high a cost. We therefore move on to examine the metaphysical premise by introducing the concept of transgenerational actions with respect to the climate crisis. We then explain how a principle of transgenerational responsibility, applicable to the case of climate change mitigation, can be inferred from the need to obtain a hypothetical consent from those who will be called to continue the transgenerational actions that the present generation will put in place.
Climate Change and the Metaphysics of the Future
Corvino, Fausto
In corso di stampa
Abstract
Why should we take action to move towards a greener world if doing so will cause the birth of a totally different group of future people? In this chapter we start from the metaphysical evidence that a large part of climate actions imply a change in the identity of future generations, as opposed to a counterfactual laissez faire attitude. This is a climatic fallout from the famous non-identity paradox introduced by Derek Parfit. Therefore, we ask if and how it is possible to defend a principle of transgenerational responsibility against this metaphysical complexity. We proceed by splitting the paradox into a moral argument, which is based on the person-affecting view of harm, and a metaphysical premise, which treats non-identity as a result of variations in timing and manner of a person’s conception. We begin by examining three different strategies through which to circumvent the moral argument: non-consequentialist accounts of harm, moral thresholds and an impersonal ethics. However, we argue that all three strategies either fall short of circumventing the non-identity paradox or they do so at too high a cost. We therefore move on to examine the metaphysical premise by introducing the concept of transgenerational actions with respect to the climate crisis. We then explain how a principle of transgenerational responsibility, applicable to the case of climate change mitigation, can be inferred from the need to obtain a hypothetical consent from those who will be called to continue the transgenerational actions that the present generation will put in place.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
